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Abstract
Roughly, the Church-Turing thesis is a hypothesis that describes exactly what can be
computed by any real or feasible conceptual computing device. Generally speaking, the
computational metaphor is the idea that everything, including the universe itself, has a
computational nature. However, if the Church-Turing thesis is not valid, then does it make
sense to expect the construction of a computer program capable of simulating the whole
Universe? In the lights of hypercomputation, the scientific discipline that is about computing
beyond the Church-Turing barrier, the most natural answer to this question is: No. This note
is a justification of this answer and its deeper meaning based on arguments from physics,
the philosophy of the mind, and, of course, (hyper)computability theory.
1 Introduction
Alan Mathison Turing is considered by many as the father of modern computer science because
he set the mathematical foundation of the rough notion of computation. In the 1930s he pub-
lished his trail-blazing paper entitled “On Computable Numbers with an Application to the
Entscheidungsproblem” [28] in which he introduced a conceptual computing device that now
bears his name. The Turing machine is a simple and elegant device that consists of a scanning
head that can move on top of an infinite tape, which is divided into cells. The scanning head
can read symbols from or print symbols on each cell, but it is not specified how it can recognize
symbols, how it can erase symbols, etc. Also, the machine’s actions are predetermined by a set
of rules called the controlling device. Despite the machine’s simplicity, one can easily see that
Turing machines can compute a great number of natural numbers and natural number func-
tions. In fact, Turing proved that the functions computable by his machine are precisely the
recursive functions (for example, see [22] for an excellent introduction to the theory of recursive
functions).
Of course the Turing machine is not the only approach to the problem of representing/computing
natural numbers and natural number functions. Nevertheless, a number of different approaches
can be used to compute/describe at most the recursive functions. This observation has led
Alonzo Church to formulate a thesis, the so-called Church-Turing thesis. This thesis, which
should be better called a hypothesis since it is not amenable to direct proof, roughly states that
only the recursive functions are computable. And since only recursive functions are computable
∗An early version of this paper was read in the “Future Trends in Hypercomputation” Workshop held in
Sheffield U.K., 11-13 September 2006.
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by a Turing machine, if one cannot construct a Turing machine to compute a number or a
function value, then it is incomputable according to the Church-Turing thesis.
In their long quest for a mechanistic explanation of the mind-body problem, advocates of
mechanism saw the Turing machine as a savior! Indeed, by supporting the idea that the brain
is a realization of a Turing machine, they concluded that mental states are just computational
states. Thus, one can easily “show” that the capabilities of anybody’s mind are delimited by the
Church-Turing barrier. This approach is known in the literature as the computational metaphor.
This metaphor has been used to “solve” so many and different problems that is almost heretical
to speak against its validity and its ability to really solve problems related to the functionality
of the human brain. In addition, any idea challenging the core of the computational metaphor
(i.e., any attempt to disconnect the capabilities of the mind from the computational capabilities
of the Turing machine), is considered by many as an unorthodox way of thinking.
In this context, it was extremely difficult to put forth the idea that the Church-Turing thesis
is not valid. Anyone defending such an idea would have to face the scepticism and, in many cases,
the sarcasm of the majority of the scientific community. Nevertheless, Jack Copeland and Diane
Proudfoot made a bold move forward and openly defended hypercomputation in [5], that is, the
idea that there are both real and feasible conceptual machines that can compute more than
the Turing machine does. Not so surprisingly, Copeland and Proudfoot’s hypercomputation did
not harm the computational metaphor. On the contrary, Copeland proposed in [4] the so-called
“wide mechanism,” that is, roughly the idea that the brain might be a hypercomputer and not
just a computer.
As was noted above, the computational metaphor was applied in so many fields, that it
was just a matter of time to be applied in physics. For example, Brian Hayes has investigated
in [9] the possibility to construct a computer program written in some ordinary computer
programming language (e.g., Java or C) capable of simulating the Universe (whatever one
perceives as such). He has reached the conclusion that although this is a particularly difficult
task, nevertheless, it is a feasible one. Nonetheless, this conclusion has a number of interesting
consequences: Let us assume that we have at our disposal a computer capable of running
such a computer program. Then, after some time, one will witness the emergence of intelligent
life forms in this virtual universe, which, quite possibly, one (virtual) day will construct a
(virtual) computer program and a (virtual) computer capable of simulating their own universe,
etc. I am convinced that this story is ideal for scripts for sci-fi movies (e.g., the movie “The
Thirteenth Floor,” see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0139809/ for movie details, is based
on a very similar idea), but it has nothing to do with reality. Nevertheless, there are many
who actually believe that we do live in a computer simulation. Going one step further, Nick
Bostrom has suggested in [2] that the human race will be able to reach the “posthuman”
stage if and only if we are living in a computer simulation! Of course, one may argue that
this idea and hypercomputation are equally absurd. However, such an argument is unfair to
hypercomputation. First, hypercomputation is about what can be computed—it is the idea
that we cannot pose artificial limits to what can be computed unless we fully understand the
cosmos. In addition, it is not some sort of obsession against the validity of the Church-Turing
thesis—it is the idea that computable does not necessarily mean Turing computable. Second, the
idea that we live in a computer simulation is closer to theology than science. After all, one may
argue that we indeed live in a “computer simulation” operated by God. But, this is an entirely
different problem, which should concern theologists and, then, probably, science fiction authors.
Plan of the paper After this introduction, I will argue against the plausibility of the idea
that our universe is a computer program running on some cosmic computer (whatever this may
mean). In particular, I will argue against the computational metaphor and against the common
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belief that all physical phenomena are computational in their nature. In the end there is a short
section presenting our conclusions and ideas for future research.
2 Is the Human Mind a Turing Machine?
My son knows how to add, to subtract, to multiply and to divide numbers—this is something
millions, if not billions, of people can do. Indeed, any average person can do (simple) arithmetic
operations, while some more gifted people can perform very complicated mathematical opera-
tions without using paper and pencil. Nevertheless, observations like this are a proof that the
human brain (that is, the brain of an average person) has computational capabilities. But, this
is certainly not a proof that the human brain is merely a computing device. In addition, it is
interesting to see what is the computational power of the brain, when considered as a biological
machine that has computational capabilities.
In the light of hypercomputation, the Church-Turing barrier does not exist and, more gen-
erally, there is no barrier to what can be computed simply because we do not have a full
understanding of our cosmos. Thus, it is only possible to compare computational devices and
classify their respective computational power. But, first, it is more than necessary to define
what computation means. In general, one may define computation as a symbol manipulation
process performed by a computational system. More specifically, a computational system con-
sists of a processor, which performs the computation, and a machinery to encode data in a
form manipulable by the processor. The partial or final result of the computation should be
decoded back to a human readable form. Sometimes, the encoding and the decoding processes
are trivial, but, in other cases, they may involve quite sophisticated procedures (e.g., think of
DNA computing). Obviously, computing devices with similar computing power should be able
to perform the same computing tasks regardless of the very nature of each computing task. The
symbol manipulation process is a dull and unintelligent process as it involves the processing
of symbols that completely lack meaning. To make this point clear, let us consider a simple C
program:
#include <stdio.h>
#define write printf
int main(){
write("10");
}
First of all, when this program will be executed1 it will print on a computer screen the string
10, but, obviously, as end users we do not have a way to tell whether this is a number or just
a numeric string. In addition, by introducing a variable (i.e., write) to have the value printf,
we are making write a new output command. So is there any meaning attached to the string
printf? Not really—the compiler has been “instruced” to output the various literals (numbers,
strings, etc.) and/or the value of variables that are surrounded by parentheses and separated
by commas when it encounters the following sequence of characters:
p, r, i, n, t, and f.
In addition, what counts here is the outter shape of the letters (symbols), or, better, their ASCII
or Unicode chararacter codes, not the sound they represent. Clearly, any a C programmer knows
that he/she has to use the string printf when in need to specify that something has to be
1Strictly speaking, this program cannot be executed. Nevertheless, one can compile it and then execute the
resulting binary program or one can directly “executed” by feeding it to a C interpreter.
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printed. But this is something no system is aware of. Instead, every time a program is compiled,
the compiler “consults” a table (e.g., the header file stdio.h and/or the C library) and then
associates this string with some machine code that implements the intended meaning of the
string. In other words, it is clear from this discussion that the following definition by Stevan
Harnad is in agreement with our short discussion:
Definition 2.1 Computation is an implementation-independent, systematically interpretable,
symbol manipulation process. [8]
From the discussion so far it is clear that meaning is more than computation. Naturally, one may
object by saying that in science meaning is attached to objects of computation. But the physical
objects, forces, etc. are there regardless of what we compute or not. In different words, the
existence of physical things is independent from the computations that are possibly attached to
them. Now, having a definition of computation, it is now possible to compare the computational
power of a brain and the Turing machine.
Admittedly, it is not an easy task to compare the computational power of the human mind
and the Turing machine. Nevertheless, it is known what is the computational power of the
Turing machine—it can compute at most the recursive functions. Thus, it suffices to see whether
the mind is capable of doing things no Turing machine can do. Typically, Turing incomputable
problems are decision problems that demand an infinite number of tryouts to produce a definitive
answer, while a typical Turing machine must produce an answer in a finite number of steps.
The reason why Turing machines fail to compute such problems is mainly because they operate
in an unintelligent way. In particular, Turing machines employ a brute-force search method to
solve problems (i.e., the machine enumerates all possible candidates for the solution and checks
whether each candidate satisfies the problem’s statement). Clearly, this is not the optimal way
to solve any kind of problem. Nevertheless, this is the most general approach to the problem of
checking whether an element belongs to a set.
The statement that the equation xn + yn = zn has no non-zero integer solutions for all
x, y, and z, when n > 2, is known in the literature as Fermat’s last theorem. As is obvious,
this problem cannot be solved by a Turing machine since it has an infinite solution space.
Nevertheless, it is in principle possible to construct a Turing machine to verify that for some
n > 0, the equation xn+ yn = zn has no non-zero solutions for all natural numbers x, y, and z.
Needless to say, this machine will never halt as it has to check that all x, y, and z satisfy the
given condition. Mathematically speaking, this problem is a co-recursively enumerable decision
problem within set theory under ZF (see [22, p. 322]). In 1995, Andrew John Wiles proved
Fermat’s last theorem by using tricks from algebraic geometry. In other words, a human gave a
definitive answer to a problem for which no Turing machine can give a definitive answer. Note
that the Riemann hypothesis (i.e., the conjecture that the Riemann ζ function has no zeroes
with real part between 0 and 1 other than those with real part equal to 1
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) is similar in nature to
Fermat’s last theorem. This means that sooner or later this problem will be solved by a human.
Also, note that it is possible even today to “construct” a Turing machine to verify particular
cases, but no Turing machine can give a definitive answer. These facts show that minds can
hypercompute, since at least one of them can do things no Turing machine can do. In general,
if the mind has computational capabilities beyond the Church-Turing barrier, its functional
structure must reflect these capabilities.
Peter Kugel has proposed in [10] a hypercompuational model of the mind, according to which
the mind consits of four different units, one of them being a trial-and-error machine (see [7, 20]).
These machines are conceptual computing devices that can solve the Turing machine halting
problem (i.e., the problem of determining whether a given Turing machine M operating on its
input I will eventually stop or not) and, thus, are a feasible model of hypercomputation as it
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will be demonstrated below. Typically, a trial-and-error machine is a kind of a Turing machine,
which can be used to determine whether an element x belongs to a set X ⊂ N, where N denotes
the set of positive integers including zero. More generally, a machine can decide whether a tuple
(x1, . . . , xn) belongs to a relation R ⊂ N
n. In the course of its operation, a machine continuously
prints out a sequence of responses (e.g., a sequence of ones and zeros with the intended meaning
for each response). Always the last response is the correct one. Thus, if a machine has most
recently printed “1,” then we know that its input element or tuple belongs to a set or a relation,
respectively, unless the machine is going to change its mind; but we have no procedure for telling
whether the machine will change again its mind or not. When a trial-and-error machine has
printed out an infinite number of responses, after a certain point it will converge to a particular
response and, thus, it will continuously print out the same response (i.e., either “1” or “0”).
Despite Kugel’s reliance on hypercomputation to describe the functionality of the brain,
even though the term was not known at the time he was working on his model, the proposed
model is in spirit with Copeland’s wide mechanism. Nevertheless, this model refutes Hayes’s
conclusion, which is equivalent to the statement that the universe is computable. On the other
hand, this model implicitly introduces the idea that the universe is hypercomputable. Still,
this is a crude approach to the problem of the functionality of the brain. ARNNs have been
introduced by Hava Siegelmann and are a form of neural networks with hypercomputational
capabilities (see [25] for a thorough presentation of ARNNs). And since analog computers are
fundamentally more powerful than Turing machines (see [13] for thorough discussion), Lee
Albert Rubel’s the-mind-as-an-analog-computer model, which is described in [23], completely
refutes Hayes’s conclusion.
Common phenomena and everyday practices follow a trial-and-error “behavioral pattern.”
For example, ordinary people learn how to solve problems by unconsciously “invoking” a trial-
and-error problem-solving strategy. In addition, evolution, the most important biological pro-
cess is roughly a trial-and-error process. Figuratively speaking, nature continuously creates new
species by evolving existing ones. The new species, which are more adaptable and more sophis-
ticated compared to their predecessors, replace their predecessors.2 Nevertheless, these are not
pure trial-and-error procedures as both are affected by “external” parameters (e.g., any kind of
climatological change affects the evolutionary process). In this respect, these phenomena and
practices are more general and might be characterized as interactive trial-and-error procedures.
Such procedures are even more expressive than trial-and-error machines, since it has been shown
that interactive systems are more powerful than Turing machines (see [30] for more details).
So, one can safely conclude that evolution is an incomputable process. Furthermore, one may
argue that any other evolutionary process is incomputable. In particular, based on the idea that
culture is an evolutionary process, an idea that was put forth by Donald Campbell in [3], one
may argue that culture is a process that is neither computable nor incomputable. I call any
process that is not hypercomputable a paracomputational process.
In general, I call paracomputational any process that cannot be described algorithmically. In
addition, paracomputational processes cannot be simulated by any computing device, though
in principle it should be possible to simulate parts of such a process. Obviously, even a hy-
percomputer cannot simulate a paracomputational process. The most striking example of a
paracomputational process is an orgasm, something that was pointed out to the author by Jaak
Panksepp in a private communication. Now, I classify culture as a paracomputational process
since it involves the communication of human minds. As was suggested by the famous Chinese
Room Argument (CRA for short), which was put forth by John Searle in [24] (but see also [29]
2Recent research results, presented in [26], contest this last part of the commonly accepted evolutionary process
by providing evidence that two particular homo species, a predecessor and a successor, actually co-existed longer
than expected.
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for a fresh look to the CRA), the mind is not a realization of a Turing machine. As might be
expected, not everybody shares this view of things (for example, see [19] for a recent collection
of papers discussing the CRA). Roughly, the argument goes as follows: a person who neither
speaks Chinese nor understands the Chinese writing system is inside a room and is equipped
with a rule-book. He receives questions in Chinese printed on piece of paper by a person fluent
in Chinese. Using the rule-book, the person inside the room can type in responses on piece of
paper. The outsider establishes a communication with the person inside the room and thinks
that he actually speaks Chinese, but, as we have noted, he does not. The core of this argument
is that dull symbol manipulation does not require intelligence to be carried out. As it was noted
above computation is just this—dull manipulation of meaningless symbols. Obviously, an av-
erage mind can achieve more than any computing device, since, for example, it is capable of
understanding the meaning associated to printed words. In other words, reading is not merely
a symbol manipulation process, but something more. So culture is a paracomputational pro-
cess, since it can be viewed as an entity consisting of minds that interact and, consequently,
continuously change it.
I have showed that even if we accept wide mechanism the Universe is incomputable. However,
the Universe is not just incomputable it is paracomputational since minds, which are parts of
this Universe, have such properties. In conclusion:
Thesis 2.1 The Universe when viewed as an entity is incomputable and paracomputable.
3 Is the Universe a Turing Machine?
Pierre-Simon Laplace was probably the first thinker who advocated that the Universe is com-
putable. Laplace’s daemon is a na¨ıve explanation of why it is possible to know everything that
goes on in the Universe. Essentially, Laplace’s daemon is no different from Haye’s computer
program. A more sophisticated theory of a computable Universe was presented by Conrad Zuse
in his monograph “Rechnender Raum” (Calculating Space [32]), which was published in 1969.
Zuse advocated that one should be able to answer physical questions using the tools of automata
theory. In a nutshell, Zuse supported the idea that everything physical is granular in nature
as what we perceive as continuoum can be divided into discrete cellular automata.3 Cellular
automata are computing devices that do not violate the Church-Turing thesis, thus, it is in
principle possible to compute all physical phenomena and, consequently, to compute the future.
Naturally, this “conclusion” does not take into consideration conclusions such as these that was
presented in the previous section. Of course, thinkers who try to show that the Universe is
computable, take it for granted that everything in this Universe is actually a computable entity.
Although, this view is definitely wrong, the general argument about the computational nature
of the Universe is based on the assumption that space and time are granular.
Stephen Wolfram’s is another thinker who advocates that the Universe is computable. He
has introduced in [31] the so-called principle of computational equivalence. This principle states
that “almost all processes that are not obviously simple can be viewed as computations of
equivalent sophistication.” As an application of this principle, Wolfram has used it in order to
explain the phenomenon of free will. In particular, he argues that “[f]or even though all the
components of our brains presumably follow definite laws, I strongly suspect that their overall
behavior corresponds to an irreducible computation whose outcome can never in effect be found
by reasonable laws.” From this, Wolfram goes one step further and concludes that free will
3At http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CellularAutomaton.html one reads that “[a] cellular automaton is a
collection of ‘colored’ cells on a grid of specified shape that evolves through a number of discrete time steps
according to a set of rules based on the states of neighboring cells.”
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is just an illusion! Clearly, Wolfram provides no proof for what he claims. Based on a vague
principle and by assuming something about our brains, for which there is no scientific evidence,
he actually dares to conclude that free will is an illusion! Fortunately, not all physicists deal
with such delicate issues in such a reckless way. For example, Kip Thorne in his lucid account
of the nature of black holes points out that “free will is a terribly difficult thing for physicists to
deal with. We usually try to avoid it. It just confuses issues that otherwise might be lucid” [27,
p. 507].
If cellular automata can explain free will, they can also explain life as a physical phenomenon.
Indeed, Wolfram asserts that biological systems are the outcome of some simple programs (i.e.,
cellular automata). It is true that certain biological phenomena have an algorithmic nature.
For example, the pigmentation of see shells is a process that can be simulated by a computer
(see [15] for more details). One the other hand, as was shown in the previous section, evolution,
which is the most important aspect of life, is an incomputable process. Therefore, biological
systems cannot possibly be the outcome of some simple (or even quite complex!) programs. Of
course Wolfram does not stop here. He actually proposes that everything in this Universe is the
outcome of a simple program! But this cannot be possibly true since there are incomputable
phenomena. On the other hand, this seems to me like a digital theology, where God is replaced
by a computer.
Norman Morgolus is another thinker who believes that the Universe and everything con-
tained in it are computers. In particular, he advocates that “Nature is more like a spatially
distributed Cellular Automaton than like a conventional von Neumman machine” [14]. In dif-
ferent words, he totally agrees with Wolfram. Clearly, if the Universe is not granular, then these
theories will become groundless. So what is known about the nature of space and time?
Richard Lieu and Lloyd Hillman presented in [11] evidence that space and time are not
discrete. In particular, they used images of a distant galaxy taken by the Hubble Space Telescope
to directly test whether time continues to have its usual meaning on scales of ≤ tp =
√
~G/c5 ≈
10−44s, where tp is the Plank time formed by the speed of light c, the quantum scale ~, and the
gravitational constant G. Also, Roberto Ragazzoni, Massimo Turatto, and Wolfgang Gaessler
using similar techniques reached identical results that are described in [21]. Nevertheless, these
findings did not remain immune to challenges. In particular, Jack Ng and his collegues cannot
conclude in [17] “that modern theories of quantum gravity have been observationally ruled
out.” Interestingly enough, Ng and his collegues have used the techniques developed by Lieu
and Hillman to rule out two of the three theories of quantum gravity!
If there are (strong?) indications that space and time are not granular but continuous, does
it make any sense to try to find the ultimate limits of computation? Of course not! In spite
of this, there are attempts to specify first the limits of computation and then to describe the
ultimate computing device. The most striking examples of such devices are Seth Lloyd’s ultimate
laptop, which is described in [12], and Ng’s black-hole-as-a-computer, which is described in [16].
In particular, Ng without providing a definition of what is computation argues that if ν is the
number of operations per unit time and I the number of bits of information in the memory
space of a black hole, then it holds that Iν2 . t−2
p
. The number ν¯ of operations per unit of
time is given by ν¯ = Iν. Of course, when Ng says that a black hole computes, this implies
that he is in a position to interpret certain sequences of events that take place inside a black
hole as computation. More generally, it seems that Ng accepts universal realizability (i.e., the
claim that anything can be described as implementing a computer program). Also, it is obvious
that Ng and Lloyd do accept the validity of the Church-Turing thesis. Now, in the light of
hypercomputation, one could argue that black holes are hypercomputers. But if black holes
hypercompute, then no one can say anything about the capacity of their “memory” or their
“computational” capabilities. So, no one can say anything about ultimate computing devices,
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even if universal realizability is correct.
When one claims that a black hole computes, then of course it makes sense to claim that
a chair computes, a house computes and even the paper you are reading right now computes.
But if they compute, what do they compute? Following, Wolfram one would argue that all
things physical compute the future. Also, one may argue that the Universe is a gigantic analog
computer consisting of zillions computers, each of them computing its own future. However, the
problem with such a thesis is that it contradicts with the definition of computation presented
in Definition 2.1. It does make sense to ask: what are the symbols being processed and what are
the rules that are followed? In addition, one should note that even modern digital computers
do compute just because we have designed them to do computations. And of course when we
switch off any computing device it stops processing information. So it is pure mysticism to claim
that a material object (e.g., a book, a chair, or the Universe itself) computes something.
For the moment let us ignore all objections that presented so far and let us accept that
space and time are granular and that the Universe is computable. Clearly, this would mean that
all phenomena that take place in the Universe will be computable. But, if one could show that
there are incomputable phenomena taking place in the Universe, then we would have a direct
proof that the Universe is not computable—an otherwise computable Universe cannot possibly
have incomputable constituents. So are there any incomputable physical phenomena?
Marian Pour-El and Jonathan Richards have shown in [18] that non-computability emerges
naturally in wave propagation. In particular, they considered the wave propagation
∇2ψ =
1
v2
∂2ψ
∂t
on compact domains and managed to find an incomputable function there. In addition, N.C.A.
da Costa and F.A. Doria have managed to express the halting function in the language of calculus
(for example see [6]). The essence of this discovery is that the halting function is in principle
computable, if we agree that everything that can be given an explicit mathematical expression
can be computed in some way. Moreover, Alisa Bokulich showed in [1] how to perform an infinite
number of quantum mechanical measurements in a finite amount time, thus, implicitly showing
that non-computability is an essential ingredient of a quantum mechanical world.
Although, I cannot accept the idea that the Universe is a finite entity, still it is pedagogi-
cally useful to think that what the majority of the scientific community considers as Universe
is a gigantic analog machine. But the Universe is incomputable and events take place non-
deterministically:
Thesis 3.1 When viewed as an entity the Universe is an incomputable analog machine that
operates in a non-deterministic way.
4 Conclusions
I have argued why we cannot construct a computer program capable of simulating the universe.
First of all, I have explained that conscious beings have both hypercomputational and para-
computational capabilities. Thus, it is not possible to “(hyper-)compute” the mind of conscious
beings. The Universe cannot possibly be granular, that is, space and time cannot be possibly
discrete and so the Universe is analog in its very nature. Also, there are purely physical phe-
nomena that are incomputable, which clearly implies that the Universe cannot be computed.
In other words, we cannot debug the Universe!
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